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Human Services and the Voluntary Sector: Towards a
Theory of Comparative Advantage
DAV I D  B I L L I S* A N D  H OWA R D  G L E N N E R S T E R**
A B S T R AC T
This article explores whether human service organisations in the volun-
tary sector possess characteristics which might assure them of possible
comparative advantages over the for-profit and public sectors with
respect to certain sorts of users. We argue that there are inherent struc-
tural characteristics of organisations in each sector (for example, owner-
ship, stakeholders and resources) which predispose them to respond 
more or less sensitively to different states of ‘disadvantage’ experienced
by their users. These states are defined as financial, personal, societal and
community disadvantage. We suggest that voluntary organisations have
a comparative advantage over other sector agencies in areas where their
distinctive ambiguous and hybrid structures enable them to overcome
problems of principal–agent gap, median voter reluctance, weak mes-
sages from politicians to staff and lack of market interest.
By taking ideas of comparative advantage into account, a coherent case
can be developed regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the expanded
role of voluntary agencies in welfare provision. In essence, the article con-
tends that a diminution in stakeholder ambiguity, resulting from organi-
sational growth, lowers the comparative advantage of voluntary agencies.
I N T RO D U C T I O N
It has become a cliché of modern social policy that we now live in a
mixed economy of welfare. It was always thus, of course. The state in
Britain came relatively late to the provision of human services and only
Jnl Soc. Pol., 27, 1, 79–98 Printed in the United Kingdom 79
© 1998 Cambridge University Press
* Director, Centre for Voluntary Organisation, London School of Economics.
** Professor of Social Policy and Administration, London School of Economics.
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Annual Conference of the Association for
Research on Non-profit Organisations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA) in San Francisco in October
1994 and at the Annual Conference of the Social Policy Association Sheffield Hallam University in
July 1995.
The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of participants at these conferences and several
anonymous referees.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Oct 2012 IP address: 158.143.192.135
since 1945 to a dominant role. The state may be withdrawing but it does
not automatically follow that the ‘voluntary’, ‘third’ or ‘non-profit’ sector
should take its place. Private markets are growing in sophistication and
scale. What room is there for a third sector and of what kind?
Our purpose in this paper is to explore whether – specifically in the
realm of human services – voluntary organisations possess characteris-
tics which might assure them of possible comparative advantages over
the for-profit and public sectors with respect to certain sorts of users. In
this exploration we shall attempt to demonstrate that despite claims that
the sectors are ‘blurring’, the sector concept remains a powerful explana-
tory tool. We shall not argue that any one has a monopoly of the virtues.
Rather our case is that there are inherent ‘structural’ characteristics of
organisations in each sector (for example, ownership, stakeholders and
resources) which predispose them to respond, more or less sensitively, 
to the different states of ‘disadvantage’ experienced by their users. 
These states are defined as financial, personal, societal and community
disadvantage which can lead individuals and groups to a breakdown 
in independent living.
This article is intended to be first, a theoretical exploration designed to
provoke debate and secondly, we hope, an attempt to test the validity of
our exploration.
D E F I N I T I O N S
Some preliminary definitions are in order. First, we are not seeking to
analyse the contribution of all voluntary organisations. Our prime con-
cern is with ‘human services’, that set of welfare agencies which provide
care, cash, education, shelter and support to people, very often with sig-
nificant personal interaction between the agency and the individual
client or user (Donovon and Jackson, 1991; Hasenfeld, 1992). The term
is neutral between the sectors that may provide these services –  private
for profit, state or voluntary.
Second, there is the very notion of a ‘sector’ and the term voluntary or
non-profit. Although boundary lines are difficult to draw, legally, and in
terms of the primary stakeholders, there is a very clear difference between
agencies which are owned by shareholders and have to make a profit and
those which do not. There is also a clear difference between an organisa-
tion set up by statute and responsible to an electorate, and private organi-
sations that are not. This is not the place to debate this issue at length. We
rest on the structural/functional definition of Salamon and Ahneier
(1992, pp. 10–13) which despite some reservations, will suffice as a
working definition. That is to say, the voluntary, or what now may 
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increasingly be called the ‘third sector’, can be defined as a collection of
organisations that are (a) formal or institutionalised to some extent; (b) pri-
vate – institutionally separate from government; (c) non-profit-distributing
– not returning profits generated to their owners; (d) self-governing –
equipped to control their own activities; (e) voluntary – involving some
meaningful degree of voluntary participation. There is some blurring at
the edges, but at their core there is a sector that is distinct in legal, finan-
cial and organisational terms.
A third concept, which is discussed fully later, but which is central to
our argument is that of ‘stakeholder ambiguity’. By ambiguity we mean
that the traditional division of stakeholders, such as owners, paid staff
and consumers or users is replaced in voluntary agencies by a bewilder-
ing complexity of overlapping roles.
W H Y D O E S A V O L U N TA RY S E C T O R E X I S T AT A L L ?
This is not a new question, but it is our claim that it has yet to be satisfac-
torily answered. The standard British social policy texts on the topic are
descriptive rather than theoretical. The Wolfenden Report (1978) set out
five functions drawn from existing practice: the development of new
kinds of service to meet new needs, services to other organisations, 
liaison between organisations, representation of minority interests and
direct service. Yet the state does all these already. So does the private
market in many instances. Why should the voluntary sector do them any
better? Political scientists are attracted to study the sector because it gives
pluralism to an otherwise monolithic state. But there are other ways to
achieve pluralism – local state and community or market. In any case,
wishing to see institutions exist is not the same as asking why do they
exist?
British writing about the voluntary sector has a long and distin-
guished history and a full review is well beyond the possibilities of this
paper. Nevertheless, a brief examination of several of the key texts of the
past twenty years provides a necessary introduction to our discussion.
A good starting point is the series of papers and books by Hadley and
Hatch (for example, Hadley et al., 1975; Hatch, 1980). Both writers were
contributors to the 1977 Wolfenden Report and their book Social Welfare
and the Failure of the State (1981) represents probably the first serious,
albeit brief, attempt to analyse the different organisational characteris-
tics of the various sectors. A more detailed researched-based work is
Hatch’s study of three English towns (Hatch 1980). Here, the questions
are asked: what are voluntary organisations and how can they be 
classified? Again, the relevance for this paper is the tentative steps taken
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to link different types of voluntary organisations – defined as mutual aid,
volunteer organisations, special agencies and funded charities – with
organisational characteristics and the nature of the beneficiaries.
A new phase of rather more theoretical British voluntary sector writing
coincides with the rise of an established body of international scholars,
and the establishment of several new academic journals. The key writings
can be traced in a number of collected works (Batsleer et al., 1992; Billis
and Harris, 1996; Smith et al., 1995). In this new phase several authors
have grappled with issues close to our starting question. For example,
Paton (1992), who builds a model of the provision of goods and services
based on two dimensions: (a) organisational purposes and (b) degree of
institutionalisation. ‘Purposes’ range from private profit through to those
organisations that exist for the benefit of others. Institutionalisation
ranges from small informal organisations to large bureaucracies.
The British literature needs to be complemented by a substantial body
of American writings in this area. These works – perhaps because of the
very different cultural, institutional, economic and policy context – have
often addressed more directly the issue: why does the sector exist? Key
contributions are to be found in the work of Weisbrod, Hansmann,
Salamon and Kramer (see DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990 for a review of
the sociological and other literature).
Weisbrod (1986) is a good starting point: he begins with a model in
which people in society ‘behave rationally in pursuit of their individual
objectives of utility maximization’ (1986, p. 22). This drives their voting
behaviour. Some want more collective goods and some less. Only 
the median voter is fully satisfied. Some will be sufficiently dissatisfied 
to join organisations that provide more. ‘Voluntary organisations come
into existence as extra governmental providers of collective-consumption
goods’ (p. 30, italics in original). Thus non-profits come into being to 
provide the extra high quality collective goods that the for-profit sector
cannot.
The difficulty with this explanation is that voluntary organisations, do
not primarily seem to be providers of collective goods. Moreover, human
services with which we are concerned are essentially private goods,
though with some public good elements to them. A more general inter-
pretation of the Weisbrod thesis is that not only do markets fail but so do
governments (Le Grand, 1991; Wolf 1979; and in a different tradition
Hadley and Hatch, 1981). Voluntary organisations therefore come into
existence to meet human service needs that are not met by the ordinary
market, but at which governmental services are inefficient. Government
failure is the result of centralised monopoly provision, self-interested
82 David Billis and Howard Glennerster
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providers and professionals, much discussed in the public choice literature.
Once again, however, it is not clear why the voluntary sector provides the
only or main answer. Decentralised state services and quasi-markets
between public providers are recent alternatives. The voluntary sector
may provide additional and more varied competition and hence improve
the market choice, but just why this should be the case is not obvious or,
at least, not explicitly discussed.
The original collective goods deficiency theory of Weisbrod was criticised
by Hansmann (1980, 1987). He also observed that most non-profits were
not providing collective or public goods. Building on earlier work by Nelson
and Krashinsky (1973) he approached the question not from the point of
government failure, but from market failure. Contracts of certain kinds (for
example, aid to the starving in Africa) are very difficult to police. Donors
are more likely to trust non-profits with gifts. This is what he calls the ‘non-
distribution constraint’: those who control the organisation have less
incentive to take advantage of their customers. Voluntary organisations
therefore have a comparative survival advantage, providing the value of
such protection outweighs their evident ‘inefficiencies’ (1987, p. 29). This
may explain why voluntary groups serve very vulnerable people. But why
should they be any better at it than the state sector? Moreover, are volun-
tary agencies so free from the distribution constraint – the capacity to 
distribute donors’ money to paid staff, even if there are no shareholders? A
for-profit agency might compete successfully on low administration and
high trust qualities. The differences between for-profit and voluntary
agencies are not captured in the Hansmann thesis.
In contrast, Salamon (1987) presents a theory of ‘voluntary failure’:
previous theories, he claims, have failed to differentiate between govern-
ment’s role as a provider of funds and deliverer of services, and have
failed to acknowledge the reality of third party government. According to
this view it is the government and market which should be regarded as
the residual mechanism in the provision of collective goods: collective
action on community problems is best done on a voluntary basis by the
voluntary sector. Unfortunately, the voluntary sector, for all its strengths,
cannot generate enough resources: it is vulnerable to particularism and
favouritism of the wealthy, paternalism and amateurism – hence volun-
tary failure. However, it is not clear from this why any voluntary organi-
sations should survive long term.
In short, we have a sequence of economic theories that point to the
weakness of whole systems: market failure, government failure and vol-
untary failure. Voluntary organisations thus end up doing things that
they are relatively least bad at – a theory of comparative disadvantage.
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These theories tend to be system-wide, focused on the supply side and to
concentrate on a system’s negative characteristics.
A more positive approach is to be found in the substantial corpus of
work by Kramer which stretches back to the early 1960s. His seminal
Voluntary Agencies in the Welfare State (1981) focused on the individual
agency and – amongst other things – explored the basic characteristics,
unique functions and vulnerabilities of voluntary agencies. He draws
attention to ‘prominent features’ of agencies. For example, they are inter-
est groups and they have considerable discretion in their use of resources.
Their unique functions are: (a) specialisation in a problem, a group of
people or a method of intervention; (b) advocacy; (c) consumerism and
other forms of volunteerism; and (d) service provision, which is seen as
the most pervasive and least distinctive function.
Traditional social policy discussion in Great Britain has tended to take
a line much nearer to the Kramer view, but it has emphasised the pio-
neering role of the sector. The sector is a path finder and experimenter
with new services or newly recognised groups in need (Wolfenden,
1978). The underlying assumption is that the state will step in when the
experiment is seen to work and the service becomes part of the main-
stream welfare state. This is a line of argument largely absent in the
United States and not at all part of the rationale advocated by the New
Right in the 1980s. Once again it leaves relatively untheorised the rea-
sons for the sector’s supposed advantages in being innovative, as well as
at what point it becomes beneficial to move to state provision.
It is true that these early American theories have moved on to some
degree (e.g., James, 1989; Kramer et al., 1993; Mason, 1984; Salamon in
Clotfelter 1992; Young, 1983). One of the core works (Hansmann,
1980) has not been ‘revisited’ by Steinberg and Grey (1992). Nevertheless,
the reasoning remains largely concerned with the supply-side character-
istics of voluntary agencies. Any full theoretical discussion ought surely
to be as concerned with the users as the providers, the demand as much
as the supply side.
T O WA R D S A T H E O RY O F C O M PA R AT I V E A D VA N TA G E
While grateful for the above corpus of work, we remain unconvinced that
it provides an answer to the question with which we began. Our first
complaint is that it does not differentiate clearly enough between the sec-
tors and the incentive structures that differentiate them. Our second
complaint is that it does not incorporate the users of human services and
their characteristics or the interaction between users and organisations.
We begin with a brief look at the core organisational characteristics of
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the different sectors. This is then followed by a section with considers the
types of demand put on the agencies by different categories of client. We
conclude that some kinds of deprivation may be more effectively
responded to by agencies in one sector rather than another.
Sector characteristics: the supply side
We wish to posit several key organisational features which we believe are
characteristic of each of the sectors. Table 1 attempts to display organisa-
tional characteristics of the sectors. We divide these for simplicity into the
stakeholders (who and what is the organisation driven by), the formal
organisation structure, the core finance or resources and who the work-
ers are.
In Table 1 we have laid out just a few main factors which highlight the
enduring differences in sector organisation, hence justifying its contin-
ued use as a powerful metaphor. Such factors cannot be ignored in any
consideration of differential response or comparative advantage. Even
this modest outline takes us immediately into deep water and we are
aware both of the debates that surround some of the components of the
model, and other factors that might have been included. We are merely
trying to highlight some distinctive features of the sectors.
Put crudely, public sector agencies are driven by what politicians believe
will secure them the necessary votes for re-election (for an account of the
median voter approach see Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). Despite the
criticism of this approach we nevertheless agree that: ‘The median voter
theory is a factor which no elected government can afford to ignore for
long . . .’ (Self, 1993, p. 106). We are reminded of the power of the
approach in the UK, when, faced with what appeared to be a humiliating
defeat in the European election, the prime minister attempted to strike a
chord with voters by making a strident attack on homeless people and
calling for the removal of ‘beggars’ from the streets. The structure of
most UK governmental human service agencies is that of the large
Human Services and the Voluntary Sector 85
TA B L E 1
Sector Driven by Structure Core Finance Workers
Public Median voter Bureaucratic Taxes Paid: some volunteers
and re-election
Private Shareholder and Bureaucratic Sales Paid
profit related goals
Voluntary Multiple stakeholders Ambiguous Taxes Paid and volunteers
Donations 
Charges
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bureaucracy of paid staff organised into accountable managerial 
hierarchies with a clear division between those who control the agency
(A), the paid staff or bureaucrats (B) and the users or clients (C); what
Billis (1993b) elsewhere has called the ABC division. The core financial
basis (Glennerster, 1997) is derived in one way or another from taxation,
despite the growth of sales and even charitable contributions to, for
example, hospitals. The core staff are paid, notwithstanding the substan-
tial number of volunteers used in hospitals (often overlooked in the
debate).
UK private sector human service agencies have until recently been a
minor feature of welfare provision, although the growth of private health
care provision and residential homes for the elderly have begun to
change the picture. Ignoring for the moment the ‘principal–agent prob-
lem’, that is to say ‘how to get one person or organisation to act on behalf
of another’ (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 214), we assume private sec-
tor agencies to be driven by shareholders and the need for profit. Other
goals are present but they must be consistent with sufficient rewards to
shareholders to ward off potential take-overs. They too are bureaucrati-
cally organised with the ABC division, as previously discussed. They are
primarily financed by sales of services and would not use volunteers,
although volunteers may well be active in the private sector’s community
programmes. Again, we acknowledge the complications presented by the
small family concern, but their relatively tiny role in overall UK service
provision provides some justification for bypassing this problem at this
juncture.
Voluntary human service organisations, as defined at the start of this
paper, present a far more complex challenge for analysis, and represent
another of the founding puzzles of the field. This is evident from the start
when we attempt to examine what drives their missions and policies. In
this analysis we have no choice but to short-cut the discussion and pre-
sent our own case that such missions and policies are driven by multiple
stakeholders. Whether it be ‘enterpreneurs’, any combination of Board
and staff, funders of whatever sort, members, volunteers, users or even
the dead hand of past charismatic leaders, we suggest that multiple
stakeholding is the general dominant characteristic. We also suggested
that stakeholder ‘ambiguity’ is a key distinguishing feature of voluntary
agencies, e.g., they can share the characteristics of public and private
bureaucracies as well as the features of the pure membership association.
The resource complexities have been well charted (Gronbjerg, 1993),
and the use of volunteers is a critical feature.
The supply side that we postulate is thus more complex than that
86 David Billis and Howard Glennerster
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which often appears to underpin the purely economic approaches which
take organisational structures as given. Voluntary agencies may be the
more effective suppliers in some situations, and for some clients, precisely
because they are ambiguous and complex. Similarly, unambiguous
bureaucratic structures accountable to median voters and shareholders
may not be the best suited to meet the needs of different types of clients. It
is to a discussion of a number of these different client types that we now
turn.
The demand side: states of client disadvantage
Our main contention is that it is not possible to understand the compara-
tive advantage or disadvantage of sectors or organisations without 
looking at the characteristics of the clients and their interaction with the
supply characteristics of different agencies. Most services provided by the
for-profit sector and most services provided by the state are used by 
utility-maximising individuals and can be analysed in terms that are
familiar to economists and political scientists. However, human service
organisations are our main concern, and they are frequently dealing
with people disadvantaged in one form or other. We have therefore found
it useful to relax the central assumption that underpins much of tradi-
tional economic writing which posits individuals as all being rational
self-interested utility maximisers. Likewise, political science theories, 
particularly those of the newer public choice tradition, posit voters as
self-interested utility maximisers.
Our alternative approach is to group the various states of severe 
welfare problems that might beset citizens and lead them to be incapable
of benefiting from traditional supply mechanisms. In this section we 
offer initial definitions and a brief statement of some questions to be
addressed.
In the first place individuals may have little or no money and find it diffi-
cult to survive. They may be financially disadvantaged, lacking the purchas-
ing power to seek solutions in the market. In practice the position is often
more complex, since the individual may not be able or willing to use the
market in a responsible way for themselves: they may, in other words, be
demonstrating an additional form of disadvantage (see below). They may
also be expected to act as agents on behalf of others, particularly children,
and here we encounter another version of the principle–agent problem.
Quite separate from financial disadvantage might be those individuals
who are in what we might call a state of personal disadvantage. They are
potential users who cannot articulate a coherent preference from the
organisation in question. This group would include people with learning
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difficulties, or mental health problems, young children and confused
elderly people. Even if they had the money, they would be unable to 
exercise their preferences on the organisation. They cannot be ‘rational
utility maximisers’.
Third, there may be individuals and groups who are, at any particular
time, societally disadvantaged. In other words they are ‘blamed’ or stigma-
tised. They may be perfectly capable of exercising their ‘exit’ and ‘voice’
functions (they are not personally disadvantaged), but society chooses
not to listen or makes it difficult for them to achieve economic power.
Their entry into the job market may be limited and politicians may lose
votes if they support their cause. In the UK this has been the case with
gay people, ethnic minorities and single mothers in recent years.
Finally, there are those who suffer primarily from the fact that they live
in a particular community –  they are community disadvantaged. They live
in areas where the market, political and civil structures have broken
down. ‘Respectable’ firms will not wish to risk opening shops in such
areas or providing work. The usual political parties have more or less
ceased to operate: voters in other parts of the town have no interest in
allocating taxes to those living in those areas. This is a situation ripe for
the entry of the anti-state illegal organisations, the mafias and the local
criminal fraternities.
We have so far questioned the extent to which the concept of the 
‘rational utility maximising individual’ provides a sophisticated enough
explanation for understanding the role of the voluntary sector. We have
introduced a ‘cross industry’ approach, and an initial categorisation of
states of disadvantage in order better to understand the puzzle. We have
also noted that we believe that the different structures of the agencies in
the different sectors have implications for their predisposition and ability to
respond to different categories of disadvantage. We turn now to examine
this in slightly more detail.
Where may the comparative advantages be?
If this approach is to be fruitful we need to examine the manner in which
the structural features of ‘typical’ agencies in each sector might cause
them to align with particular categories of disadvantage – or the way in
which disadvantage attracts specific organisational response. However, it
will shortly become evident that combinations of disadvantage are likely
to provide a more satisfying explanation than simple correlations
between one disadvantage and a specific sector response.
In the case of financial disadvantage by itself, the state in most instances
can, if the need is deemed justified, provide the cash and thus remove the
88 David Billis and Howard Glennerster
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disadvantage. If the money is going for a purpose for which there is a
general consensus in society, the state provides the money, the politicians
know what they want, and the clear (ABC) accountability structure of
their agencies can enable services to be offered in accordance with politi-
cal and median voter wishes. In summary, unless combined with another
disadvantaged condition which, as we have noted, may well be the case,
it is difficult to see what comparative advantage today’s UK voluntary
agencies have in this area. By itself, ‘poverty’ is probably too blunt a 
concept to have much explanatory power. Giving financial help is suited
to a public agency with clear rules and clear lines of accountability to
political representatives of the taxpayer. This is a role which the British
social security system carries out well. However, where it has to deal with
vulnerable, stigmatised individuals, it is much less successful. This cate-
gory is discussed below.
Those who are personally disadvantaged require others (parents,
guardians) to act on their behalf. Contract failure offers an explanation
for situations in which rational consumers cannot evaluate the service
accurately. But what if the consumer requires ‘others’ that do not exist,
do not care or whose interests conflict with those who are disadvan-
taged? In these instances also, the private sector is unlikely to be seen to
have any comparative advantage. The state service delivery agency is an
obvious possible alternative solution but median voter pressure is likely
to be weak, and the organisation is likely to receive weak messages from
politicians in defining their goals and standards. Normal practice will be
therefore to leave it to the ‘professionals’ to act as the interpreter and
guardian of the personally disadvantaged person. (We shall use the term
professional to refer to a member of staff, who in a governmental agency
would usually be paid, and who employs a recognised body of knowl-
edge.)
The long history of abuse and scandal in UK public institutions sug-
gests that reliance on professional training and codes is not necessarily
enough. Professionals are accountable to politicians who are not neces-
sarily the best equipped to fulfil the role of ‘guardians’ of personally 
disadvantaged people since such politicians may lack the required 
motivation, sensitivity and knowledge. Here we contend that the multiple
stakeholder and ambiguous structure of the voluntary agency can offer
comparative advantages.
Our concept of stakeholder ambiguity draws on the research undertaken
by one of the authors since 1978 with voluntary agencies in the UK.
During this period more than 20 in depth case studies have been under-
taken, and some 300 agencies have participated in research workshops
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and courses in which the material has been tested and refined. This UK
material is reinforced by a further study of 14 non-profits in the United
States. (Much of the history and details of this research and the full expo-
sition of the concept can be traced in Billis, 1993a, 1996.) The concept of
stakeholder ambiguity, which utilities the ideas of Leach (1976), was origi-
nally developed in response to the distinctive organisational problems
presented by participants in the early research programme. Those prob-
lems were not fully addressed by traditional theories which were primar-
ily concerned with the large bureaucracies of the private and public 
sectors. The idea of stakeholder ambiguity also provides, we believe, a
persuasive response to the long-standing scholarly puzzle, found in the
various academic disciplines which have studied the voluntary sector, of
sector overlap, ‘fuzziness’ or ‘blurring’ (Billis, 1993c). (Perhaps the most
concentrated body of writing on this subject is to be found in the 1987
special edition of the former Journal of Voluntary Action Research (vol. 16,
no. 1 and 2).
In essence, the notion of ambiguity begins by positing that there are
four ‘worlds’ within which social problems can be resolved: governmental
and private sector bureaucracies, associations and the personal world.
Each of these worlds has its own unambiguous and well-known rules of the
game. Thus bureaucracies (organisations which employ paid staff) rely on
the managerial command system, associations on concepts of member-
ship and voting; the personal world rests on unbounded ideas of commit-
ment, love and affection. In so far as the word ‘owners’ can be applied to
all these worlds, each has its own distinctive structure of ownership. Since
this paper is concerned with organised policy responses to widespread and
often severe problems we have in Table 1 only considered the ‘unambigu-
ous’ private and public sector worlds. For simplicity therefore we have not
brought the associational and personal worlds into the picture.
We contend that there are many organisations that are ambiguous:
that although their roots and ownership rest firmly in one sector, they
nevertheless possess some of the structural features of other sectors. Of
these, the most interesting in our context are those organisations which
have associational roots and are neither owned by the government nor
by the private sector, but yet have adopted the key characteristic of
bureaucracies and have employed paid staff. These organisations are
what we might call voluntary agencies as distinct from voluntary mem-
bership associations. Again, for ease of exposition, we have simply
referred to these in Table 1 as the ‘voluntary sector’. Hence it is impor-
tant to bear in mind that despite the fact that ‘agencies’ may represent
the fastest growing part of the sector and are the focus of current UK 
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policy attention, there is nevertheless a vast and mainly unexplored terri-
tory of genuine membership associations.
The key characteristic of the ambiguous voluntary agency is the 
complexity of overlapping roles. This has been particularly identified in
the governance structure where there is often overlap in the roles of 
governing bodies and paid staff. A striking example of this is provided by
the Pre-school Playgroup Association (Brophy, 1994, p. 162):
From their inception playgroups were organised by mothers, some groups employed a
paid leader but most were dependent on (unpaid) mothers working alongside the paid
leader. Thus, the providers of the service, the users of the service and its managers were
all mothers and frequently the same mothers doing all tasks.
Our research has demonstrated that whereas in private and public sector
bureaucracies where, in the main, there is clear-cut differentiation
between employer and employee, employee and non-employee, provider
and recipient, chairperson and director, director and subordinate, Board
or management committee and staff, owners and others, in voluntary
agencies all these categories can overlap in every possible combination.
And for the voluntary agency, these are not idiosyncratic and temporary
aberrations, but a fundamental, structural characteristic resulting from
their occupation of both the associational and bureaucratic worlds. It is
not surprising therefore that stakeholder ambiguity is often accompanied
by deeper tensions between the demands of the bureaucratic paid staff
command structure and requirements of the democratic membership
association based on voluntary effort. (In passing we must note the pro-
liferation of organisational forms which, whilst they have their roots and
ownership in the governmental sector, have adopted characteristics more
usually associated with the voluntary sector, for example hospital
‘trusts’.)
Moving on to consider the implications of stakeholder ambiguity for
our analysis, we suggest that one consequence, for example, is that the
gap between users and those in authority can be less given the potential
for greater motivation, sensitivity to, and knowledge about client need.
However, ambiguity can also lead to poor communication, with a gov-
erning body that is secure in its own ignorance.
Stakeholder ambiguity can mean that members of the governing body
are expected to raise or donate funds for the operational purposes of 
the agency, or they can perhaps be there because they have personal
knowledge of a particular disadvantaged state. Volunteer service deliv-
erers may well be a widespread source of labour, and they too may be on
the governing body. They may also be present or past sufferers from a
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particular disadvantage and therefore may be more sensitive to disadvan-
taged people. The critical point is that the political market failure and the 
formal hierarchy failure we identified earlier in public bureaucracies can
be overcome within the informality of an ambiguous and relatively small
voluntary organisation.
There is a price to be paid. Professionals (both paid and volunteer) in
voluntary agencies can find themselves in disagreement with other
stakeholders. Relationships between professionals and governing bodies
are notoriously difficult in parent-run agencies. We must also bear in
mind that, except for children, a state of personal disadvantage may well
be lifelong. The resource demands, say, for residential care are likely to be
huge. In this case the voluntary agency, unless it has very substantial
independent funding, is likely to have a narrow definition of eligible
groups or has to become heavily engaged in pressure group activity to
persuade voters and governments to change any negative attitudes. But,
all in all, there is a prima facie case to argue that voluntary agencies may
have a real competitive advantage in restricted but important areas of
human service provision, where their structures produce incentives for
more sensitive service.
Stigmatised individuals and groups, those we have referred to as 
societally disadvantaged – again by definition – are unattractive customers
for public sector agencies. If they have the money such customers can
utilise certain very expensive private clinics for alcoholics, drug users,
etc. but one exception to the general failure of governmental agencies to
enter this particular field is that of the UK National Health Service (NHS),
which is still large enough, and carried sufficient public esteem, to deal
with drug addicts and Aids victims, as part of its general work. This part
of its remit rarely comes to public attention and little is known with
respect to user needs and preferences. The advantages of stakeholder
ambiguity, argued in the case of personal disadvantage, hold here also,
but they are not absolute. The for-profit agency can comfortably deal
with those who have the money and are capable of expressing their pref-
erences. Voluntary agencies will have an advantage particularly when
societal is combined with financial disadvantage.
Those facing community disadvantage suffer from an absence of the 
normal institutions of civil society. Shops, together with other signs of a
market economy, have disappeared along with public services. The state
has the resources and may intervene when a riot looms, offering a flower
festival or some other colourful short-term intervention to satisfy the
average voter that something is being done. But intervention, in the
main, has been short term and incoherent. These deprived areas are now
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one of Europe’s major chronic problems, to which neither the state nor
the market have been able to respond. Self-help and community mobili-
sation, despite the resource constraints, appear to be one of the few
ingredients of a possible upwards cycle (Power, 1993). The churches may
have a particular role, both in helping to recreate a true civil society, but
also through its encouragement of human service agencies in these
areas. The argument so far may be summarised in Table 2.
It is not the purpose of this article to test our theory exhaustively. That
must wait longer-term research, although a review of available evidence
on the effects of Community Care plans and voluntary organisations
(after also noting the absence of empirical data and conceptual clarity),
agrees with the general thrust of this paper in questioning the appropri-
ateness of traditional economic theory (Mocroft and Thomason, 1993).
Nevertheless, some preliminary evaluation is possible. If we take the first
column and ask how far the various sectors respond to the financial
needs of the poor, it is fairly clear that the state does provide the bulk of
this activity. There are private money lenders who make very expensive
loans to the poor, but such provision is insignificant compared to the vast
scale of state activity. Interestingly, the voluntary sector did, in the nine-
teenth and earlier centuries, make an important contribution to reliev-
ing poverty with cash aid. The work of the Charity Organisation Society
and other cash giving agencies not only declined as state cash-giving
grew, but also increasingly took on the task of relieving personal disad-
vantage. Cash giving is now an insignificant part of the tasks of the 
voluntary sector. While there is no systematic UK research in this area,
the withdrawal of American non-profits from the relief of poverty is
analysed by Salamon (1993).
When we turn to the column headed ‘personal disadvantage’, we pre-
dict a large voluntary sector component and we do find these organisa-
tions exceptionally well represented. A higher share of their total activity
may fall under this heading than any other. Again, although systematic
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TA B L E 2. Comparative advantages of sectoral provision
Disadvantage Financial Personal Societal Community
Sector
Public + + – – + –
Private for-profit – + – – –
Voluntary – + + + –
Key
Strong +
Either + –
Weak –
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UK research is absent, a glance through the publicity of the Charities Aid
Foundation (1995) demonstrates their significant role amongst human
service organisations: Barnardos, NSPCC, MENCAP, National Childrens
Home, to name but a few of the largest agencies. The state is clearly impor-
tant in this field too, but its scope is more widespread. Organisations that
deal exclusively with the stigmatised are to be found almost exclusively in
the voluntary sector. Here are to be found hundreds of often smaller organ-
isations, such as local groups of MIND, Community Drug Helpline, Turning
Point, Phoenix House, Bow Mission, etc. The specialist treatment of groups
like AIDS patients by the state typically has a public health rationale as a
significant element, rather than care and compassion as such. Finally, our
own experience of working in the most deprived communities suggests that
churches and self-help and voluntary groups are often the last resort,
when even the main stream public services have given up.
Clearly these impressions need to be thoroughly assessed. There are
counter examples. But it seems to us there is enough of a case here to be
worth fuller examination and testing. It does seem that we find a higher
proportion of human service activities dealing with personal, societal and
community disadvantage. This framework does provide a rational for 
considerable voluntary non-profit activity. The extent will vary through
time. One society may hold certain disabilities to be stigmatic, another
may not. The definition of disadvantage is after all social. So must be the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of the voluntary sector.
C O N C L U S I O N S A N D Q UA N DA R I E S
Our intention has been to open up a line of enquiry which brings together
the supply side characteristics of welfare agencies in the different sectors
with the demand side characteristics of a number of different categories
of disadvantage. The general thrust of our argument has been that it is
the very complexity or ambiguity of voluntary organisations which can
provide them with comparative advantages.
Moving rapidly through the disadvantaged states, we suggest that
where the problems are well understood and supported by the general
public, and political messages to professionals are clear (as with problems
of general financial disadvantage), the governmental bureaucratic service
agency should have a comparative advantage. We are not convinced that
in the UK in these types of situations, public sector ‘welfare bureaucrats’
are primarily motivated by their own interests and unwarranted organi-
sational growth (Tullock, 1965; Niskanen, 1971). Our own experience
(for a critique of public choice theories see Self, 1993: 34) leads us to
believe that this can be a phenomenon present in any sector.
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As we have tried to indicate earlier, voluntary agencies may well have
a comparative advantage in responding to those people who are in what
we have called a state of personal disadvantage. However if they have the
money, ‘guardians’ may choose private sector agencies (clinics and
homes, etc.). The particular conditions whereby guardians with indepen-
dent resources choose voluntary rather than for-profit agencies for those
for whom they have responsibilities are as yet unexplored. Voluntary
organisations of course often suffer from a less reliable resource base, 
and this must be juxtaposed with their advantages of sensitivity and
motivation.
A similar argument can be employed when examining societal disad-
vantage and the comparative advantages of the different sectors, particu-
larly government and voluntary, the two main competitors in this area of
need. The stronger the political consensus and the greater the resources
demanded, so too will the governmental agency have greater advan-
tages. Voluntary agencies have advantages where motivation and sensi-
tivity are in scarce supply. As long as the NHS has wide based public sup-
port, with a committed staff and an ample supply of potential nurses and
doctors, with many thousands of people prepared to volunteer for work
in hospitals (a phenomenon sometimes overlooked in sector analysis),
and many members of the general public prepared to donate money in
addition to paying their taxes, then it is difficult to see much scope for a
renewal of voluntary sector activity. Following this line of argument
takes us to questioning whether the recent opted-out hospital trusts 
can really be treated as part of the voluntary sector. More likely, in our
view, is that this is an attempt to steal some of the voluntary sector’s
organisational clothes, whilst remaining in all key respects public sector
institutions.
We have included in our analysis the state of community disadvantage. It
appears to us to be the most intractable problem for UK public policy. We
believe that voluntary agencies do have an advantage in this area.
Indeed, talk of ‘comparative advantage’ may be too optimistic where
there may be little other organisational alternative. Certainly the track
record of government is so far pretty dismal.
Our general argument is that voluntary agencies have a  comparative
advantage over other sector agencies in areas where their distinctive
ambiguous and hybrid structures enable them to overcome problems of
principal–agent gap, median voter reluctance, weak messages from
politicians to staff and lack of market interest. We must emphasise again
that we have considered only severe welfare problems. We have not dis-
cussed the pervasive, less severe states of discomfort. We have a strong
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belief that in this area of need the voluntary organisation reigns
supreme, and that this area certainly warrants further research.
We are not sanguine regarding notions of comparative advantage. It is
perhaps best to see advantages as intrinsic characteristics which in the
real world may, or, as we have hinted several times, may not be fulfiled.
Moreover, theories that attempt to explain why any sector exists run the
risk of defending the status quo, of building the theory on the basis of
current situations. Whilst theories of the sector must naturally relate to
the world as it is, or more often a specific country, they should also help
resolve or shed light on current dilemmas or even perhaps at future
minefields. The final part of this paper raises several issues of concern.
Quandaries
Our line of reasoning leads to one central quandary facing UK voluntary
agencies, the question of their expanded role in welfare provision (Lewis,
1993; Billis and Harris, 1992). Again it is not a new problem, but we
suggest that by taking ideas of comparative advantage into account, a
coherent case can be developed. Put simply, we argue that the less the
stakeholder ambiguity, the lower the comparative advantage. For exam-
ple, if increased size leads to increased differentiation and separation of
stakeholder roles, we contend that comparative advantage begins to
diminish. If paid staff, governing body and users are all quite separate, all
the problems faced by agencies in other sectors begin to appear. If service
volunteers begin to depart the agency and/or begin to move out of any
governance roles as well, then ambiguity diminishes. So whilst sympa-
thetic to the general tenor of papers that are also worried about volun-
tary sector scandals and erosion of legitimacy, it is far from certain that
the solution lies in the design of ‘practical criteria for the identification 
of stakeholders’ (Ben-Ner and Hoomissen, 1994: 412). Stakeholder
ambiguity cannot be eliminated without destroying comparative advan-
tage. On the other hand, we would not wish to give the impression that
ambiguity necessarily implies a confused organisation – rather it implies
a flexible, changing and informal structure.
The other main advantage of the voluntary organisation is its lack of
reliance on the voter market place, driven by the concerns and prejudices
of the median voter. The more voluntary organisations become the vehi-
cle for state money, the less this will be true.
To sum up. We have put forward initial thoughts regarding a theory of
comparative advantage which takes into account both the organisational
features of human service agencies and the different states of user disad-
vantage. Following this approach leads us to question the long-term 
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viability of voluntary agencies that attempt to respond to large-scale
needs outside the core areas of personal, societal and community 
disadvantage. Their very real advantages are likely to be particularly
seen where personal and societal needs and combined, and where they
are not overwhelmed by resource constraints. Seen in this light, organi-
sational growth, for example as a result of contracting with public agen-
cies, is certainly a phenomenon to be carefully monitored by those who
are interested in the public policy role of voluntary agencies, and also by
those who are concerned to ensure a healthy voluntary sector. Over
eager ‘privatisers’ may be destroying the very comparative advantages
the sector has to offer.
R E F E R E N C E S
J. Batsleer, C. Cornforth and R. Paton (eds.) (1992), Issues in Voluntary and Non-profit Management,
Addison Wesley, Open University, Milton Keynes.
A. Ben-Ner and T. Van Hoomissen (1994), ‘The governance of nonprofit organizations: law and
public policy’, Journal of Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 4: 4, 393–414.
D. Billis (1993a), Organising Public and Voluntary Agencies, Routledge, London.
D. Billis (1993b), ‘The ABC of profit and nonprofit organization’, in D. Hammack and D. Young
(eds.), Nonprofit Organizations in a Market Economy, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.
D. Billis (1993c), ‘Sector blurring and nonprofit centres: the case of the UK’, Nonprofit and Voluntary
Sector Quarterly, 22: 3, 241–57.
D. Billis (1996), ‘Who cares whether your organisation survives?’ in D. Billis and M. Harris (eds.),
Voluntary Agencies: Challenges of Organisation and Management, Macmillan, London.
D. Billis and M. Harris (1992), ‘Taking the strain of change: UK local voluntary agencies enter the
post-Thatcher period’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 21: 3, 211–25.
J. Brophy (1994), ‘Parent management committees and pre-school playgroups: the partnership
model and future management policy’, Journal of Social Policy, 23: 2, 161–94.
P. DiMaggio and H. Anheier (1990), ‘The sociology of nonprofit organization and sectors’, Annual
Review of Sociology 1990, 137–59.
F. Donovan and A. Jackson (1991), Managing Human Service Organisations, Prentice Hall, London.
P. Dunleavy and B. O’Leary (1987), Theories of the State, Macmillan, London.
H. Glennerster (1997), Paying for Welfare: towards 2000, Harvester-Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.
K. Gronbjerg (1993), Understanding Nonprofit Funding, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco.
R. Hadley et al. (1975), Across the Generations: Old People and Young Volunteers, Allen and Unwin,
London.
R. Hadley and S. Hatch (1981), Social Welfare and the Failure of the State: Centralised Social Services
and Participatory Alternatives, Allen and Unwin, London.
H. Hansmann (1980), ‘The role of nonprofit enterprise’, Yale Law Journal 1980, 89: 835–901.
H. Hansmann (1987), ‘Economic theories of nonprofit organization’, in W. Powell (ed.), The
Nonprofit Sector: a Research Handbook, New Haven, Yale University.
Y. Hasenfeld (ed.) (1992), Human Services as Complex Organizations, ch. 1, Sage, California.
S. Hatch (1980), Outside the State: Voluntary Organisations in Three English Towns, Croom Helm,
London.
E. James (1989). ‘The private provision of public services: a comparison of Sweden and Holland’, in
E. James (ed.), The Nonprofit Sector: an International Perspective, pp. 3–31, Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
R. Kramer (1981), Voluntary Agencies and the Welfare State, University of California Press, California.
R. Kramer et al. (1993), Privatization in Four European Countries, N. E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York.
E. Leach (1976), Culture and Communication, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Human Services and the Voluntary Sector 97
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 08 Oct 2012 IP address: 158.143.192.135
J. Le Grand (1991), ‘The theory of government failure’ British Journal of Political Science, 
21; 423–42.
J. Lewis (1993), ‘Developing the mixed economy of care: emerging issues for voluntary organisa-
tions’, Journal of Social Policy, 22: 2, 173–92.
D. Mason (1984), Voluntary Nonprofit Enterprise Management, Plenum Press, New York.
P. Milgrom and J. Roberts (1992), Economics, Organization and Management, Prentice-Hall, New
Jersey.
I. Mocroft and C. Thomason (1993), ‘The evolution of community care and voluntary organisa-
tions’ in S. Saxon Harrold and J. Kendall (eds.), Researching the Voluntary Sector, Charities Aid
Foundation, Tonbridge.
R. Nelson and M. Krashinsky (1973), ‘Two major issues of public policy and organization of supply’,
in R. Nelson and D. Young (eds.), Public Subsidy for Day care of Young Children, Heath and 
Co, Lexington, MA.
W. Niskanen (1971), Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Aldine-Atherton, Chicago.
R. Paton (1992), ‘The social economy: value-based organisations in the wider society’, in J. Batsleer,
C. Cornforth and R. Paton (eds.) Issues in Voluntary and Non-profit Management, pp. 3–13, Addison
Wesley-Open University, Milton Keynes.
A. Power (1993), Hovels to High Rise: State Housing in Europe, Routledge, London.
L. Salamon (1987), ‘Of market failure, voluntary failure, and third-party government: towards a
theory of government-nonprofit relations in the modern welfare state’, Journal of Voluntary Action
Research, 16: 1 and 2.
L. Salamon (1992), ‘Social services’ in C. Clotfelter (ed.), Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector?,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
L. Salamon (1993), ‘The marketization of welfare: changing nonprofit and for-profit roles in the
American welfare state’, in Social Service Review (March), 16–39.
L. Salamon and H. Anheier (1992), ‘In search of the nonprofit sector 1: ‘The question of definition’,
Working Paper No. 2, The Johns Hopkins University Institute for Policy Studies.
P. Self (1993), Government by the market?, Macmillan, Basingstoke.
J. D. Smith, C. Rochester and R. Hedley (1995), An Introduction to the Voluntary Sector, Routledge,
London.
R. Steinberg and B. Gray (1992), ‘The role of nonprofit enterprise in 1992: Hansmann revisited’,
Paper presented at 1992 ARNOVA Conference, New Haven.
G. Tullock (1965), The politics of bureaucracy, Public Affairs Press, Washington, DC.
B. Weisbrod (1986), ‘Towards a theory of the voluntary nonprofit sector in a three-sector economy’,
in S. Rose-Ackerman (ed.), The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
C. Wolf (1979), ‘A theory of non-market failure’ Journal of Law and Economics, 22: 107–39.
Wolfenden Report (1978), The Future of the Voluntary Sector, Croom Helm, London.
D. Young (1983), If not for Profit, for what?, Lexington Books, Lexington.
98 David Billis and Howard Glennerster
